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by Paul Chilton and George Lakoff

EDITOR'S NOTE

This newsletter is distributed by the **CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN LANGUAGE**, a research center at the University of California, San Diego that unites the efforts of disciplines such as Linguistics, Cognitive Science, Psychology, Computer Science, Sociology, and Philosophy, all who share an interest in language. We feature papers related to language and cognition (1-10 pages, sent via email) and welcome response from friends and colleagues at UCSD and institutions. Please forward correspondence to:

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BACK ISSUES

Back issues of this newsletter are available from **CRL** in hard copy as well as soft copy form. Papers featured in previous issues include the following:

*The Cognitive Perspective***Ronald W. Langacker**Department of Linguistics, UCSD
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vol. 1, no. 4, May 1987*Dimensions of Ambiguity***Peter Norvig**Computer Science, UC Berkeley
vol. 1, no. 6, July 1987*Where is Chomsky's Bottleneck?***S.-Y. Kuroda**Department of Linguistics, UCSD
vol. 1, no. 7, September 1987
(2nd printing of paper in no. 5, vol. 1)*Transitivity and the Lexicon***Sally Rice**Department of Linguistics, UCSD
vol. 2, no. 2, December 1987*Formal Semantics, Pragmatics,
and Situated Meaning***Aaron Cicourel**Department of Sociology, UCSD
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vol. 3, no. 1, September 1988*A Connectionist Perspective on Prosodic Structure***Mary Hare**, Dept. of Linguistics, UCSD**David Corina**, Dept. of Psychology, UCSD**G.W. Cottrell**, Dept. of Computer Science, UCSD
vol. 3, no. 2, November, 1988*Competent Scientist Meets the Empiricist Mind***Valerie Walker**Department of Philosophy, UCSD
vol. 3, no. 4, April, 1988

Cognitive Linguistics Workshop

On May 13 and 14, 1989, a small workshop was held at UCSD, uniting cognitive linguists primarily from UC San Diego and UC Berkeley. Speakers and titles of talks are listed below.

Jane Espenson, *Metaphors for Causation*

Chuck Fillmore, *Semantic Determinants of Grammatical Form in English Conditional Sentences*

Rick Floyd, *A Cognitive Analysis of Evidentiality in Wanka (Quechua)*

Suzanne Kemmer, *What Else Happens to Anaphoric Elements*

Bob Kirsner, *Seizing the Hearer's Attention: The Strange Case of the Dutch Conversational Particle*

Rob Kluender, *Semantic Barriers to Extraction*

Jeanpierre Koenig, *Pragmatics in Construction Grammar*

Ron Langacker, *Search Domains*

George Lakoff, *Metaphor and Foreign Policy*

Rob MacLaury, *Vantages of Zapotec Body Parts*

Ricardo Maldonado, *Se gramaticalizo: A Diachronic Explanation of Energetic Reflexives in Spanish*

Teenie Matlock and Eve Sweetser, *Semantic Change from Perceptual Verbs to Evidentials and Mental State Verbs: When a Picture is and isn't Worth a Thousand Words*

Tony Moy, *Metaphor in ASL*

Sally Rice, *At*

Roula Svorou, *Space and Semantic Change*

Eve Sweetser, *Image-Schematic Mappings between Role and Individual Readings*

Karen van Hoek, *Towards a Unified Account of Reflexives*

Maura Velazquez, *Possessive Constructions in Guarani*

Dave Zubin, *Japanese wa and ga*

To: The Linguistics and Cognitive Science Communities
From: Paul Chilton and George Lakoff

The paper that follows is our first attempt to apply the theory of conceptual metaphor to the area of foreign policy. We see this as a natural part of our duties as linguists and cognitive scientists. It is our job to study conceptual structure in all domains of thought, and international relations is one such domain. The fact that it is an inherently important domain makes such a study more urgent than the analysis of conceptual structure usually is. It also makes it important that it be written in accessible language, language suitable for publication in a magazine with wide circulation. So pardon the absence of the usual scholarly apparatus: the listing of examples, the arguments for generalizations, the statements of the mappings and their entailments. They are easy to supply, but that is not our purpose here.

We would appreciate feedback. Please send comments to lakoff@cogsci.berkeley.edu and RC.PAC@Forsythe.Stanford.EDU.

Foreign Policy By Metaphor

Paul Chilton and George Lakoff

Paul Chilton, of the University of Warwick, U.K., is a MacArthur Fellow visiting at the Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control. He is the author of *Nukespeak*.

George Lakoff is Professor of Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley. He is co-author of *Metaphors We Live By* and *More Than Cool Reason*, and author of *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*.

The scenario was right out of Dr. Strangelove. General Tommy Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command in 1960, a man with his hand directly on the button, was defending the policy of massive retaliation against a more limited, restrained use of weaponry. A description of the consequences of all-out nuclear war failed to sway him. "Look," he said. "At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian left, we win!"

The scene was real: a maverick general with a metaphor and the power to command the use of nuclear weapons. The scene has changed, of course. But the metaphors and the bombs in service of them are still with us.

Metaphors are not mere words or fanciful notions. They are one of our primary means of conceptualizing the world. What has been learned over the past decade in cognitive science and in linguistics is that a vast proportion of our conceptual life is metaphorical. We think automatically, effortlessly and without notice using metaphors we have grown up with and accepted without question. We see our lives as purposeful, as journeys toward goals. It is important to Americans to 'have direction, to know where one is going,' and it is useful to have 'a head start.' What is more frustrating to an American than a sense of 'not getting anywhere with your life'—an idea that would be meaningless in much of the world.

Time, in America as in much of the industrialized world, is understood as a money-like resource. We can 'save time, waste time, spend time, budget time, and use time wisely or foolishly.' When we understand our experience through metaphorical concepts and act on those concepts, our metaphors appear real to us. If you live by a time-as-resource metaphor, someone really can 'waste' an hour of your time. If you understand life as goal-oriented, you may really feel 'lost' and 'without direction' and worry about whether you are 'getting anywhere with your life.'

Metaphor is a means of understanding one domain of one's experience in terms of another—time in terms of money, life in terms of travel. Such metaphors are so automatic, conventional, and widespread as to seem natural. It takes an acquaintanceship

with cultures where lives are not journeys with goals and time is not a money-like resource to realize the metaphorical character of our own cultural concepts.

But metaphors of some sort are not, however, dispensable. We cannot comprehend such abstract and overwhelming concepts as life and time unless we can make sense of them in terms of something more familiar. We know how to reason about travel and resources. Metaphor allows us to transfer those modes of reasoning to more problematic arenas. And the conclusions we reach on the basis of metaphoric reasoning can form the basis for action. If we are understand ourselves, to see why we act as we do and to see new possibilities for action, we must be aware of the metaphors we are using.

Unfortunately, the study of foreign policy has lagged far behind research in the cognitive sciences on the nature of metaphorical understanding. Despite the enormous effort that has been spent, on both theoretical and practical fronts, in conceptualizing and reconceptualizing foreign policy, virtually no effort has gone into understanding the metaphorical concepts on which our current policies are based.

This is hardly an accident. Foreign policy theorists pride themselves on realism, and metaphor, in the traditional view, is taken to be anything but realistic. Yet the current understanding of foreign policy, both in the popular mind and in the theories of international relations experts, is metaphorical through and through. Indeed, the expert theories typically use versions of the popular metaphors; it is this that makes them seem 'intuitive.'

The major metaphor that dominates thought about foreign policy is that the state is a person. As persons, states enter into social relationships with other states, which are seen typically as either friends, enemies, neighbors, neutral parties, clients, or even pariahs. States are also seen as having personalities: they can be trustworthy or deceitful, aggressive or peace-loving, strong- or weak willed, stable or paranoid, cooperative or intransigent, enterprising or not. Given our folk understandings of what animals are like, we will often use animal metaphors to characterize the personalities of states: thus Russia is seen as a bear and England as bulldog. Our policies are designed to be consistent with such estimations of national personalities. Thus, for example, if Russia is seen as aggressive, deceitful, paranoid, and intransigent, we will treat it very differently than we would a country seen as trustworthy, peace-loving and cooperative. Such metaphorical preconceptions lie behind policy.

The World Community

Person-states are seen as members of a 'world community'—a community of nations. Treaties are promises, and keeping one's word is important if one is to be trusted. The community is often conceptualized in the US as a kind of frontier town, with law-abiding citizens and outlaw states. Because there are outlaws, a sheriff is needed,

and the U.S. has been playing sheriff for the past four decades. Without the sheriff, there would be anarchy.

Other widespread, natural-seeming metaphors help to structure and legitimize policies and programs. For hundreds of years we have used the metaphor of the 'body politic'. If the state is a person, it has a body—and bodies can grow, mature, decline, be healthy, developed, underdeveloped, weak, strong, diseased. Metaphorical foreign policy sees the health of a person-state in terms of national wealth and military force—instead of, say, the health or well-being of its individual citizens. An 'underdeveloped country' is seen as one which is less industrialized than Western countries. 'Growth' and 'development' are seen in economic terms. States that are not 'fully developed' are therefore seen as metaphorical children, who need the help of their elders if they are to grow up to be mature adults. They are thus seen as natural dependents requiring both paternalistic help and a strong hand to keep them in line if they get naughty. Given this metaphor, it is impossible to see a third world country as knowing more than the grown up industrialized nations about the kind of economic system that will best suit its culture and geography.

The state-as-person metaphor also permits a body-politic to be seen as 'diseased,' and thus as a patient requiring treatment. George Kennan, in his famous 1946 Long Telegram that set the tone of US foreign policy for decades thereafter, urged that we must 'study' the Soviet Union with the same 'objectivity ... with which the doctor studies the unruly and unreasonable individual'. If the Soviet Union is mentally deranged, the United States must take on the role of doctor. One way of treating mental patients is to strap them in a strait-jacket, which in political terms is precisely what the policy of 'containment' was to be.

If a body-politic is sick, its 'disease' can 'spread', and 'infect' other bodies. Kennan telegraphically told the State Department that 'World communism is like the malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue'. It followed from metaphor that American society must be kept in a condition of 'health and vigor,' which meant military 'strength'. Dean Acheson in 1947 appealed to Congressmen to extend American intervention in Europe : 'the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France.' The disease was communism, and this was not the last time that the metaphor would be used. McCarthy's 'purge' of the American body-politic involved the same metaphor. It has two parts : internal disease and external contagion. Both, together with other metaphors, have been inherent in the U.S. concept of 'security' after WW II.

More recently Japan has been characterised as suffering from 'nuclear allergy' when it resisted U.S. pressures to host nuclear weapons. When West Germany sought to rid itself of American nuclear missiles based on its soil and to resist U.S. pressures to 'modernize' those weapons, Germany too was seen by some in politics and the media

was suffering from nuclear allergy. If a nation don't tolerate nuclear weapons in its body, it is hypersensitive, that is, sick.

The state-is-a-person metaphor is fundamental among academic theorists of international relations as well as in the state department. What is important is the fact that the metaphor inevitably carries theories and beliefs of human personality with it. Thus, in what is known as 'realism' and 'neorealism' in the theory of international politics, person-states are viewed as consistent individuals who are rational decision-makers and who act accordingly. What counts as 'rational' is defined as maximizing economic and military self-interest.

'Realist' and 'neorealist' theorists, of whom the best known is Kenneth Waltz, make it a fundamental assumption that states have 'desires', an overarching desire to survive and commonly a desire to dominate. This leads to a kind of social Darwinism for person-states. It is also common for 'realists' to psychologize the person-state further, to postulate natural desires, such as the desire to make others like oneself. Michael Mandelbaum, in *The Fate of Nations* (Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1988), argues that the 'impulse' for 'strong states' to 'expand' is in part explained by the desire to 'to extend the collective self,' 'to spread its domestic characteristics throughout the international system . . . to make the world like itself.' Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, twenty years earlier, had seen extension of self as the person-state's 'purpose' or 'mission' and had linked it to a 'survival instinct.' As they say in *Force, Order, and Justice* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 'a nation may preserve its body and yet perish through the loss of its soul—or the abandonment of its purpose.' This metaphorical theory of the psychology of the person-state makes the long-standing American mission to make the rest of the world over in its likeness seem natural and inevitable. And it says that we can expect the same from all other powerful states regardless of our policies.

Fistfights and Games

Seeing the state metaphorically as a power-hungry person seeking domination leads naturally to a metaphorical conception of foreign relations as competition above all else. There are two special cases of this metaphor: First, war is a fistfight, typically between two opponents. The other fighter, the Soviet Union from our point of view, is seen as a bully, rational enough not to fight someone as strong as he is, but bully enough to beat up on anyone weaker with or without provocation. Here strength is measured by number of troops in some cases and total nuclear capability in others. The United States, in this metaphor, is seen as having to be strong enough to stand up to this bully, not only to protect itself, but also the weaker kinds in the schoolyard. The theory of nuclear deterrence is defined in this metaphor: The United States must be strong enough to deter the Soviet bully from starting a fight. This, of course, depends crucially upon the bully's rationality and accurate judgment. It also depends upon the bully's assumption that the hero is willing to fight. If the hero looks like a bumbling giant, then deterrence doesn't work.

The second metaphor sees international competition as a game, typically with two players. This metaphor, taken seriously, is the basis of the common use of the mathematical theory of games in theorizing about international relations. In a zero-sum game there is a winner and a loser. There are also games in which no party can win but one can minimize losses. The Vietnam War was analyzed by American policymakers as such an unwinnable game, and hence the US did not attempt an all-out victory.

A race is a special case of a game, and for the past four decades, our foreign policy has placed us in an arms race with the Soviets. In such a metaphorical race, having enough weapons to blow up the world many times over doesn't matter, nor does having enough submarine-based missiles to assure the destruction of the enemy. The metaphorical imperative is to stay ahead or at least close in total armaments. It is unlike other races in that no one ever talks of 'winning' the arms race.

These contest metaphors have long been at the center of our nuclear policy. Paul Nitze and others have spoken of the need to have a capability to 'beat the Russians' in a nuclear contest. Robert McNamara saw the impossibility of a nuclear victory and in its place introduced the idea of a minimum deterrence: nuclear missiles that will 'survive' a first strike and thus deter an enemy from striking first. In current strategy, the emphasis is to 'house' missiles so that they will be 'survivable'. A 'kill' in contemporary strategic discourse is the destruction of a missile, not a person.

The conceptual mechanism here is a common metonymy, in which the thing used stands for the person using it. For example, in a sentence like 'An M-16 killed him', the rifle is standing for the person using the rifle. In current nuclear strategy, the same metonymy is used, only here it is missiles that are standing for the person-state using the missiles. Defense of the country becomes the defense of the weapons. Hundreds of billions

of dollars are spent to protect weapons, not citizens. The country is seen as 'surviving' not if its citizens survive, but if its weapons 'survive.'

'Realist' international relations theory, as we saw, is based on a psychological metaphor, that each person-state has a 'desire to survive.' One might think of justifying this metaphor by thinking that if the state survives, the citizens survive. But that is not so in our current 'realist' nuclear strategy which sees the country surviving if its weapons survive, even if most of its citizens perish. Our current nuclear strategy, based on metaphor and metonymy, is strangely reminiscent of Tommy Power's.

Homes

If a state is a person, its land mass is its home—and the conventional image of the American home is the one-family house. One's home must be 'secure' against 'outside' intruders. We have a 'backyard' (Cuba, Mexico, and Central America, in general), where we do not want other people's missiles. For some reason, we do not accept the idea that the Soviet Union may have a 'back yard' (Europe, Turkey), where it may be legitimately threatened by our missiles. The metaphor surfaces even in such expressions as 'window of vulnerability', a phrase powerfully deployed by those who lobbied to increase U.S. ICBM capability. An even more powerful special case of this metaphor, conceptually speaking, if not technologically, was President Reagan's vision of the protective 'roof' of the Star Wars space shield. It would keep from our heads what Truman (threatening further atomic bombing of Japan) called a 'rain of ruin'.

Incidentally, there is, at present, a homeless state—the self-proclaimed Palestinian state. It has aroused the kind of mixed feelings of pity and threat that homeless people commonly arouse.

A home—a house and grounds—is a container, with an inside, an outside, and a boundary. The state is therefore seen as a contained entity. This is a powerful metaphor in international politics. It applied as far back as the Greek city-states, but came to apply to European nation-states only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Before that the political entities of Europe were mostly such that they could not naturally be conceptualised as having an inclusive inside, an excluded outside, and a separating line around them. Medieval Europe was a collage of multiple and overlapping political and religious allegiances. It is only with the emergence of the modern nation state that the container concept becomes relevant and so well rooted in the mind that it is difficult to think of the present state-in-a-container system as anything other than a natural and immutable fact.

But this metaphor reached its full elaboration only around the middle of the twentieth century. The key terms of American foreign policy after World War II are 'security' and 'containment'. They are defined relative the state-in-a-container metaphor.

Security for a state is conceptualized in terms of being inside an overwhelmingly strong container that stops things from getting in or out. We have 'security leaks' on the one hand, and 'security penetration' on the other, 'internal' and 'external' security threats. This metaphor sees the boundary as all-important—the 'security perimeter' of American post-war policy.

It is surprising now to recall that the very term 'national security' was not current until 1945-6, when it began to emerge in Washington as a unifying 'concept'. But it is not so surprising, given the naturalness of container metaphors, that it should be appealing and get developed in the way it did.

Nor should it be at all surprising that the most central foreign policy concept of all—the concept of 'containment'—should have been so quickly adopted. It works like this. States are containers and their contents have a tendency to get out, say, by leakage, spillage, boiling over or even explosion. Another possibility is that the container itself may expand. Essentially, this is how the Soviet Union is conceptualized in post-war foreign policy. It follows from the U.S. perspective, that it needs to be 'contained'.

This is such a natural-seeming nexus of metaphors that George Kennan's notion of 'containment' could scarcely be resisted in the 1940s. It was indeed taken up with amazing alacrity and eclipsed more moderate and, many would argue, more realistic assessments of Soviet aims and abilities. And still, in 1989, the generation that grew up with these metaphors as well as the generations of political 'scientists' who have been trained to think in terms of them, cannot get outside of this conceptual universe.

The Metaphorical Nexus

All of these metaphors form a single coherent nexus with the state-as-person at the center. States are thus seen as having personalities, being members of a world community, having stages of development, being subject to disease, being rational actors, seeking domination physically and in games, and having homes that are understood as containers whose boundaries should be as rigid as possible. What is especially ironic about this is that it is a fundamental principle of realist foreign policy theorists not to confuse the individual with the state. Their own collection of state-as-person metaphors violates that fundamental principle.

A major consequence of this metaphor collection is the balance of power metaphor. It emerges from the state-as-person nexus via the view of war as a fistfight that can be avoided only if the two strongest people are about equally strong. The balance of power metaphor generalizes this, reifying the two participants as physical objects exerting force in a force field. The objects are stable as long as the two forces remain equal; if one comes to exert more force, the balance is upset, just as one fighter who becomes stronger can knock down the other.

The balance of power metaphor overlaps with war-as-fistfight view, but it is different in two important ways. First, the use of physics as a metaphorical source gives the metaphor a scientific air—for no good reason, of course. Second, it removes any notion of human will; the bully may choose not to start the fistfight, but an object exerting a more powerful physical force will always knock over an object exerting a weaker force. The effect is to make conflict seem inevitable unless an arms increase on one side is countered by one on the other side.

Just as the typical fistfight involves two participants, so a balance of physical forces is much more achievable with two major forces than with more, since the two-body problem is solvable but the three-body problem is not. The physics-based metaphor is thus commonly used to justify a world order with exactly two superpowers on the grounds that 'stability' is more achievable with two bodies exerting force than with more. The metaphor that states are objects projecting an outward force combines with the container metaphor to yield the idea of 'state expansion', in which there is 'lateral pressure' and possible 'penetration' of the boundaries of other states.

A special case of force is magnetic force, which happens to be bipolar; there are magnetic dipoles, but no tripoles. Merely thinking about force in international relations as magnetic force with 'poles' imposes a conception of world politics with a binary superpower structure.

Here is how Michael Mandelbaum, an important figure among realist international relations theorists, argues that a bipolar world is the best of all possible worlds: 'Strong states are like powerful magnetic poles; weaker ones can seldom evade their fields of force. Independence, therefore, must be redefined as equidistance among--or between--the most powerful states in the international system. Even this position is not always feasible. If the pull of one pole is stronger than that of the other, if one of the great powers is more threatening than the other, then independence requires not equidistance but closer association with the orbit of the other to offset the threat from the first.' (The Fate of Nations, p.201)

The magnet metaphor does at least two things. It makes international power politics seem as inevitable as the laws of physics, and therefore divorced from questions of freedom and rights; and it makes it seem both natural and necessary that international power politics should result in two and only two antagonistic coalitions, alliances, or blocs.

The World System Metaphor

The celebrated sociologist Emile Durkheim, who wrote in the second half of the nineteenth century, theorized that a society is a 'system,' a mechanistic universe of its own in which people and institutions are 'units' bearing structural relations to one

another. This system of relations, he claimed, defines social meaning and social identity and restricts the possibilities for social action.

Durkheim's theory of social structure plus the state-as-person metaphor yields the superstructure of contemporary international relations theory. States become 'units' and the world community becomes a system of relations, primarily power relations, among states. This system defines political meaning and political identity and restricts the possibilities for political action at an international level.

By an additional metaphor, power is seen as money and international politics becomes metaphorical microeconomics. The state-person becomes economic man and rationality for the state-person is the rationality of classical economics: maximize gains and minimize losses. With rationality defined by this metaphor, the mathematical theory of games, as it has been applied to economics, comes to define rational action for states. This coheres with the metaphor of war as a game. From within the metaphorical nexus, game theory appears to be the natural mathematics governing international relations. The laws of this self-contained metaphorical universe are game-theoretical laws.

Since the system is inherently mechanistic, its laws cannot be changed any more than can the laws of physics. The system metaphor thus coheres very well with the physics metaphor. As Waltz puts it, "A political structure is akin to a field of forces in physics." The international system metaphor thus makes it seem like a law of nature that states should act to maximize their power and that bipolar balances of power should result.

Folk Metaphors and Theorists' Metaphors

Not all of our foreign policy metaphors have the same status. The state-as-person metaphor is part of our everyday conceptual system; it is part of a folk conceptualization of governments that is widespread. It has been adopted and expanded upon by expert theorists. But we should notice where the metaphorical folk portrait of the state ends and the hand of the theorist enters the picture.

The folk view has a state-person replete with a personality, a community, a susceptibility to disease, a home, a tendency to get into fistfights, and a body that can topple under force. It is the theorist who elaborates the metaphor, portraying the person-state as a rational actor trying to maximize his personal gains, who sees states as being like children going through inevitable stages of development, who defines health and maturity in economic terms, who sees competition as a game with a mathematical structure, who defines strength by counting warheads. It is the theorist who reifies states as objects within a mechanistic system, exerting force within a political space, subject to natural expansionary pressures, knocking over other objects as they expand unless the force they exert is countered by an equal and opposite force. And it is the theorist who claims that

only a bipolar force is stable.

The theorist is typically American, sees himself as a hardnosed scientist, and calls his collection of metaphorical elaborations 'realism,' a description of the natural functioning of states.

Why Metaphors Matter

The political 'realist' who uses such metaphors might claim that they are mere words, convenient labels that accurately describe the nature of world politics. But metaphors are not just words. They are concepts that can be and often are acted upon. As such, they define in significant part, what one takes as 'reality.'

A natural question to ask is whether the American theorist's metaphors characterize an objective political reality as is commonly claimed, or whether they are self-serving means for legitimizing the policies of the US government. Take, for example, the metaphor of the bipolar world. When the United States is one of two superpowers, it serves American interests for there to be no third superpower. Since the US is a rich nation, it serves American interests to view poorer nations as childlike, to be both helped and kept in line, and told that they too will all inevitably develop by natural stages into wealthy adults if they accept our guidance.

Another possibility for the self-serving use of metaphors is in their application to particular situations. Why was Cuban intervention in Angola seen as expansionism while American intervention in El Salvador was not? As is often the case, our foreign policy experts apply their metaphors to serve American interests. Such cases are anything but a characterization of an objective reality.

What Metaphors Hide

Metaphors also hide important aspects of what is real, and it is vital that we know what realities our foreign policy metaphors are hiding.

Let us return to the Tommy Power incident, where General Power saw nuclear war as a kind of fistfight between two person-states which one could 'win' by delivering a 'knockout punch.' The hidden reality, of course, is the lives of hundreds of millions of individual people, real people, not person-states, lives that would be lost in such a 'win.'

The state-as-person metaphor hides the most basic realities of the lives of individual citizens. The state may be secure in its home while many of its citizens are not. The state may be 'healthy' in that it is rich, while its citizens may not be able to afford real health care.

Security for individual people is very different from 'national security'. Individual people need food, shelter, employment, health care, and education in order to be secure. The metaphorical notion of 'national security' has little to do with this. Spending more money on 'national security' means spending less on what makes individual people secure.

Not only does the welfare of individual citizens stand outside the state-as-person metaphor, but so does the possibility of the contributions of individual citizens to international cooperation and communication. European Nuclear Disarmament (END) has proposed a citizens assembly for a Europe foreseen as a united community. It, like groups of scientists, artists, scholars, and businessmen, plays no role in foreign policy as conceived of in terms of this nexus of metaphors.

Not only are individual citizens absent from the state-as-person metaphor, but so are multi-national corporations, which have an enormous influence both on matters of state and on the lives of individuals. A set of foreign policy metaphors that hides the role of multi-national corporations also hides much of their impact on all our lives, and does not provide an adequate public way to monitor and regulate their activities.

The state-as-person metaphor also hides most environmental issues. A few cases like the ozone hole, rain forests, and certain forms of pollution have recently been seen as threats to the world community and have begun to be taken seriously as appropriate foreign policy matters. But the full range of environmental issues does not arise in the state-as-person metaphor; this leaves them outside the domain of standard foreign policy concerns.

The metaphors for national strength also hide vital realities. Both the US and the Soviet Union have sufficient weaponry to destroy each other and the world many times over. Yet in the arms race metaphor, the fistfight metaphor, and the balance of power metaphor, this reality is not present. All that counts in those metaphors is *relative* 'strength', measured in relative amounts of firepower: Will we 'fall behind' and allow the Soviet Union to get 'stronger' than the US? The power of these metaphors overwhelms the reality that our real destructive power is more than sufficient to destroy any attacker.

The binary nature of the fistfight, balance of power, and bipolar force metaphors also hides a vital reality. The bipolar world, with the US and Soviet Union as the only superpowers, is coming to an end. By 1992, the European Economic Community will be an economic superpower. Japan already is one. As Eastern European nations gain more independence from the Soviet Union and develop closer ties to Western Europe, the concept of the Soviet bloc as a single entity will make less and less sense. And Gorbachev's moves have made the Soviet Union look less like the bully in the fistfight metaphor and less like the inexorably expanding container.

The result of all this is a conceptual crisis in American foreign policy. Because metaphors are not mere words, because they do partly define what one takes as real, our foreign policy pundits are having a progressively harder time making today's world fit yesterday's metaphors. The movement by the West Germans toward nuclear disarmament and toward rapprochement with Eastern Europe is in conflict with the bipolar world metaphor that our senior foreign policy experts helped to shape and see as the only stable configuration. They are thus warning our government not to accept the West German proposals. For example, McGeorge Bundy, speaking at Stanford on May 4, 1989 asserted strongly that the line between Eastern and Western Europe must be maintained for the security of both sides. As the Iron Curtain begins to come down, American foreign policy advisers see that as a threat to their conception of a bipolar world order.

Gorbachev's Challenge

Gorbachev's New Thinking is a conceptual challenge to the West. It is in large part a metaphorical challenge. Gorbachev has proposed, in tantalizingly inexplicit terms, his own 'house' metaphor: the common European house. It is presumably thought of more as an apartment house than the American one-family ideal. It is a new container metaphor, one that challenges what we now see as the wall of security through the middle of Europe.

American foreign policy needs to be reconceptualized. But the metaphor nexus that defines our foreign policy is so tightly woven that it is hard to change one part without changing others. Rethinking will not be easy, especially since these metaphors have come to be seen as virtually definitional of our foreign policy. Try to imagine American foreign policy without our present metaphors—without seeing states as persons each with a personality, a standing in the world community, an economic conception of health and maturity, a nuclear conception of strength, a benefit-maximizing notion of rationality, and a concept of stability in terms of a bipolar balance of power.

Limits and Possibilities

It is probably impossible to formulate a concept of what a state is without metaphor. Moreover, the folk version of the state-as-person metaphor may not be entirely eliminable since it is an automatic, largely unconscious, and long-standing conventional of conceptualizing states. The possibilities for change are limited by our everyday metaphors. What can be changed, however, are the theorist's elaborations of the folk metaphors. They need to be changed because both because they are unrealistic and because they do not serve the interests of the citizenry of states. Among the things that policy makers can do is to find new metaphorical elaborations that both serve more humane

values and highlight realities that their current metaphors hide.

One way to reveal part of what has been hidden is to conceptualize the properties of the state-person in terms of the corresponding properties of the least fortunate quarter of its citizenry. —Imagine conceptualizing the health of a state in terms of the health of the least healthy 25% of its citizens. —Imagine defining the educational level of a state in terms of the education of the least educated 25% of its citizens. —Imagine defining the wealth of a state in terms of the wealth of the least wealthy 25% of its citizens. —Imagine defining the security of a state in terms of the personal security of the least secure 25% of its citizens. —Imagine defining the rationality of a state in terms of the degree to which it devoted its resources to satisfying the fundamental human needs of its entire citizenry. Such new elaborations of the state-as-person metaphor would highlight realities that our present metaphors for the state hide. They would refocus the attention of policy-makers on the needs of citizens, which ought to provide the ultimate rationale for external policy. In short, they would link external policy to internal policy as it affects the full range of citizens.

This is basically what Gorbachev has done in a metaphorical master stroke that has not been sufficiently appreciated by our own foreign policy community. One effect of *glasnost*, or ‘openness,’ has been an opening up of the metaphorical container around the state so that external and internal policy can be seen as one and can be restructured together. In doing so, Gorbachev has confounded the metaphors of our ‘realist’ foreign policy theorists, metaphors that keep external policy separate from internal policy.

The new metaphoric elaborations we suggested above would link internal and external policy and throw light on previously hidden realities. They would then permit us to go Gorbachev one better, proposing a ‘world house’ rather than merely a European house. This way of conceptualizing the living quarters of person-states would have a number of benefits. First, it would focus on the fact that nuclear war would destroy not somebody else’s house, but rather everybody’s. Second, it would stress the necessity for cooperation in the management of common living quarters. And third, it would bring global ecological issues into center stage: If all there is is one house, then there is nowhere else to dump your garbage. Acid rain, pollution, ozone depletion, and the destruction of rain forests become everybody’s problems.

Japan

State-as-person thinking can lead to foreign policy debacles. Take the decision by the Reagan administration to devalue our currency relative to Japan’s as a way to solve our balance of payments problem. Through the lens of the state-as-person metaphor, the problem appeared as follows: America has bought goods from Japan on credit and owes Japan money. Currency devaluation will make American goods cheap to Japan and

Japanese goods expensive to America. America will not be able to afford expensive Japanese goods, while Japan will not be able to resist cheap American goods. The money Japan gives America for its goods will pay off the debt.

But Japanese leaders in business and government did not think in state-as-person terms. They kept selling to America by keeping their prices in America low, they kept out American goods by imposing tariffs, and made up their losses with increased efficiency. The brunt was borne by Japanese workers who worked harder and were denied cheap American goods. America's trade debt was not reduced, and Japanese companies were able to buy American property cheaply. The Japanese saw internal and external policy as a single unified whole, while the Americans, via the state-as-person metaphor, saw only the external.

Openness Here

The concepts used by our government and our international relations experts are of vital concern to us all. Those concepts are metaphorical through and through. The metaphors have important entailments for our lives and for the lives of millions of others. Yet the metaphors and their entailments have largely gone unrecognized and unexamined. The reason is simple. It concerns the structure of the profession. In the social sciences, the technical seems to drive out the nontechnical: international relations scholars must appear as scientific and objective as possible, and metaphorical concepts seem neither objective nor scientific. The result is a set of concepts that are not only inadequately examined, but are also very far from the realism that is claimed for them.

As cognitive scientists whose job is to study the concepts used in language and thought, we are appalled by this situation. We think that the time has come for an open and public discussion of the concepts used by the 'experts' in thinking about and formulating foreign policy. The role of the media is crucial in this. Only the media can bring about such an open discussion.

We have two suggestions for theorists in the area of foreign policy. —Learn to analyze the metaphorical nature of the conceptual tools you are using and learn the consequences of those metaphors. —Test their consequences in terms of what is real: the basic human experiences and needs of real people.

Metaphors are among our most important tools for comprehending the world. They may well be necessary tools for understanding the nature of world politics and for formulating policy. They need to be better understood and they could certainly be put to better use.